Banking & Finance

The attack path ends with money moving.

Fraud crews do not need to encrypt a core to win. They need identity, a rushed wire, or an over-permissive integration. We test community banks, credit unions, and financial firms against those paths — framed for the board and the examiner.

Talk to an operator
Treasury desk with dual monitors and a wire-callback folder on an empty chair

Why this matters now

The risk is moving. The emphasis has to move with it.

The costliest financial crime still runs through people and process. Identity, wires, and third-party access are how it becomes a transfer.

What’s changing

Identity and social engineering

What it exposes

Employee or customer compromise — including AI impersonation

Why it matters to the business

Fraud and financial loss

What’s changing

Wire and payment workflow abuse

What it exposes

Unauthorized transfers that look like business as usual

Why it matters to the business

Loss, plus the evidence examiners will ask for

What’s changing

Third-party and API access

What it exposes

A silent path into core workflows

Why it matters to the business

Customer trust and regulatory exposure

What’s changing

Back-office ransomware

What it exposes

Operations halted at peak cycles

Why it matters to the business

Availability, reputation, and examiner scrutiny

In this environment

What we look for in a financial environment

We start from the workflows that move money — identity, wires, APIs, and the third parties sitting on those paths — not a generic network sweep.

  • Identity and privileged access

    Employees, customers, and the accounts that can authorize a transfer.

  • Transaction and core systems

    The workflows where fraud becomes a posted movement of funds.

  • APIs and cloud banking

    Integrations and tokens that extend the core beyond the branch.

  • Employee access and back office

    Shared drives, ticketing, and the systems that halt operations when encrypted.

  • Third parties and wire workflows

    Vendors, fintechs, and the callback process that is supposed to stop a bad transfer.

Operations room for identity, payment, and API workflows — no readable account data

The question we prove

Can compromised identity become unauthorized financial activity?

We prove whether a convincing email, a stolen session, or an over-permissive integration can reach a wire, a payment file, or a core workflow — and whether the controls that should stop it actually hold.

The path we walk

A path from identity to a transfer

This is the progression we see in real financial engagements. We find it, prove it, and close it — in language a board can act on.

  1. 01

    Employee / customer identity

  2. 02

    Privileged access

  3. 03

    Financial workflow

  4. 04

    Transaction / wire activity

  5. 05

    Financial loss

    Financial loss

Where Open Security meets the path

  1. Find
  2. Validate
  3. Prioritize
  4. Remediate
  5. Retest
Open Security Portal dashboard used to brief bank leadership and examiners on residual fraud risk

What leadership sees

What a finding means for the institution

A weak control is not the briefing. Whether it can move money — and what evidence you can show an examiner — is.

Consequence

Which transfer, customer channel, or back-office process the path can abuse.

Priority

Sequenced by fraud impact and transaction integrity — not a generic score.

Regulation

Mapped to FFIEC guidance, PCI, and the customer-data rules already on the exam calendar.

Ownership

Treasury, fraud, information security, and the vendor on the integration.

Remediation

Controls sequenced so the money-moving path closes first.

Leadership visibility

Portal so the board and examiners see residual risk as fraud exposure, not ticket volume.

Frameworks this maps to

  • PCI DSS

    Cardholder-data testing and evidence when the path touches payments.

  • FFIEC guidance

    Alignment for community bank and credit union programs.

  • GLBA / SOC 2

    Customer data protection and third-party assurance.

After the assessment

The work continues after the assessment

Closing one wire path is not the same as staying ahead of the next lure. Remediation, retesting, and readiness stay tied to how money actually moves.

Remediation sequenced by fraud impact

The transfer path closes first; the rest of the backlog follows in examiner-ready order.

Retesting that proves the chain is closed

The same identity-to-wire path, walked again, so evidence is more than a ticket status.

Tabletops for treasury and fraud

Callback failures, AI impersonation, and who can freeze a transfer after hours.

Training from real financial lures

Awareness built from BEC and vendor-impersonation paths we see against institutions your size.

Continuous exposure monitoring

Identity, APIs, and internet-facing banking systems stay in view between exams.

Proof, in this industry’s language

Community Bank

$2.4M

wire-fraud chain stopped before it moved

A tabletop replay plus MFA hardening closed the exact path operators walked — framed for the board, not as a phishing score.

Know which path can move money.

Talk through your transaction environment with an operator — identity, wires, APIs, and the controls examiners will ask about.